About this event
The rise of remote work has created new information asymmetries as fewer workers come into the office, making their actions on the job harder for companies to monitor. In this paper, we examine how firms have responded to this challenge, focusing on the role of high-powered incentives. Building on the Principal-Agent model with moral hazard, which predicts that remote work should increase companies’ reliance on performance-based pay, we explore this relationship empirically using dictionary methods applied to the near-universe of US online job postings between 2018 and 2022. Controlling for several sources of potential bias and measurement errors, we estimate that remote job vacancies are twice as likely to provide performance pay as onsite ones, making remote workers potentially more vulnerable to adverse economic shocks.
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This event will take place in SAL 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, Sir Arthur Lewis Building, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH.
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